With the election behind us, the time has come for
some election reflections. And, no, it is not too soon to begin the process. They
have already begun assessing and will soon begin strategizing for the next
election. Sorry, but for those who care about winning elections, there is
little, if any, political off-season.
Here are the cold, hard facts.
The top vote-getter in the election was Tony
Palomba, with 3,251 votes. John Airasian finished second with 3,177 votes, one
vote ahead of Caroline Bays, who got 3,176.
In horse racing terms, we might say that Palomba won
by a length and Airasian placed second by a nose. However you frame it, it was
a close race. John Gannon, a last-minute Progressive adoptee, finished fourth
with a surprising 2,916 votes.
Please note that two years ago, in 2019, Palomba
received 2,556 votes, Bays 2,355 and Gannon 2,170. Two years earlier, in 2017,
Palomba received 2,644, Bays 2,657, and Gannon was not on the ballot.
If anything jumps off the page about the Progressive
vote totals in 2017 and 2019, it’s that both Palomba and (especially) Bays actually
lost votes in 2019, but what happened between 2019 and 2021 should be seen by any
staunch non-Progressive as a five-alarm wake-up call −
Palomba picked up 695 votes, Bays 821, and Gannon 746.
Those totals are the facts we have. Since there are
no exit polls, we can only speculate as to who voted for whom and the reasons
behind the way they voted. But if we (staunch non-Progressives of all political
persuasions) want to keep Progressives from controlling the levers of local
government, we need to win the next election, and in order to do that, we need
to try to figure it out.
Even If being a candidate for city council, two
years from now, is just a gleam in your eye, this is a good time to begin
getting your mental ducks in a row. You need to know, with as much certainty as
possible, who you are, because if you don’t define your political self, someone
else will and, chances are, that person or persons will not have your best
interests in mind.
The election campaign became a war of labels. One
strategy that popped up attempted to characterize the election as a contest
that pitted townies and longtime residents against newcomers.
The underling argument was: They don’t share our values and they don’t know
the town the way we do, so they have no right making decisions that will change
the character of our town.
We might call that “social labeling.” And we need to
ask ourselves: Was that social labeling an effective strategy?
I don’t think so. If it were, we would still be the “City
Known as the Town of Watertown” instead of the City of Watertown, Megan
O’Halloran might be on the council, and the charter amendments which included
the establishment of a human rights commission probably would not have passed.
In this election, non-voters spoke loudly and
clearly. They will enthusiastically exercise their right to bitch −
What the hell is happening to this town? − but nothing you or I
say, and not even the red-hot police issue, will make them vote. Non-voter
has become a hard-reality, fact-of-life, social and political label.
When it comes to local elections, political labels
usually play a behind-the-scenes role. With the exception of Progressives, who
embrace that label, candidates for local office usually do not label themselves
Democrat, Republican, liberal, moderate, conservative, centrist, center-left,
or center-right. One reason is that to do so might narrow their voter appeal.
But candidates can’t stop others from labeling them.
On one social media site, at-large candidate John
Airasian was labeled a “conservative.” Some of his supporters countered by
labeling him a “moderate.” Did any of it matter?
When candidates get incorrectly labeled,
intentionally or unintentionally, will that label stick well enough to cost the
candidate votes? Probably. And that’s a problem, but I think the bigger problem
is: What do any of those labels actually mean in today’s political arena? Moderate
has come to mean different things to different people. Does John Airasian
consider himself a moderate? And do others, including some of his supporters,
consider him a liberal or a conservative, or something else?
As times change, labels don’t fit everyone the way
they used to. They become too loose or too tight, or the person evolves and no
longer likes the style. So the old worn-out labels become much less valuable
when it comes to defining candidates and identifying and categorizing voters.
If you are a potential future candidate, or campaign
manager, or activist, or just an ordinary citizen, who is rightly alarmed about
the direction of local government, it might help to have a new set of labels,
built around our principles, attitudes, and differences, that more accurately
define us politically.
And now, we do.
Thanks to Pew
Research Center’s New Political Typology, we can dispense with the old labels,
and begin thinking in terms of political types.
Whether you know it or not, you are a political type
and, unless you are an outlier, you fit into one of nine political typology
groups. Four are Democratic, four are Republican, and one is a combination of
both.
Each of the groups include Independents who lean
either Democratic or Republican − and the vast majority of Independents
actually do lean toward one party or the other.
The Democratic coalition is made up of these four
typology groups: Progressive Left, Establishment Liberals, Democratic
Mainstays, and Outsider Left.
The Republican coalition is made of these four
typology groups: Faith and Flag Conservatives, Committed
Conservatives, Populist Right, and Ambivalent Right.
A ninth group, Stressed Sideliners, are
equally split between the Democratic and Republican coalitions.
For an in-depth understanding of the Pew Research
Center study, and their methodology, you should read it in its entirety.
(If you have serious thoughts about being a candidate for city council, you
should read it, study it, print it, and keep it by your bedside for at least
the next two years.)
What you will find below is my attempt to create a
helpful cheat sheet. Though it is limited to (most, not all) major characteristics
of each political typology group, it might give you what you need to identify
your own political type and to make an educated guess on the political type of others.
More importantly, it can sharpen our discussions by getting us using more
accurate terminology.
This is a high-tech war, and we are unlikely to win
it with low-tech, obsolete weapons. So, let us begin with the most basic of
basic training − learning the terminology.
First the Democratic coalition:
(Please note: all of the descriptive information is
either taken verbatim from the study or is edited for brevity. None of it is
original to me.)
Progressive Left
They are the smallest group (12%) in the Democratic
coalition and are the most politically active group in the coalition.
They are the highest-percentage majority White and
the least racially diverse group in the coalition. They are 68% White, 10% Black,
11% Hispanic, and 6% Asian.
They are equally split between men and women.
They are the second youngest type. About 34% are
under 30 and 71% are under 50.
They differ from other Democratic groups in their
belief that racial injustice needs to be addressed by changing laws and
rebuilding institutions.
48% of Progressive Left believe that police funding
should be decreased − a view held by only 22% of Establishment Liberals and
only 11% of Democratic Mainstays.
Progressive Left stand out as the only typology
group in which a majority say that “success in life is pretty much determined
by forces beyond our control” rather than “everyone has it in their own power
to succeed.”
Establishment Liberal
They are 23% of the Democratic coalition, making
them its second largest group.
51% are White, 18% are Black, 20% are Hispanic and
10% are Asian. 53% are women.
23% live in upper-income households − more than any
other Democratic-oriented typology group.
47% have college degrees and 25% have postgraduate
degrees.
Politically, they are highly engaged, but somewhat
less than Progressive Left.
What most separates Establishment Liberals from
Progressive Left is that Establishment Liberals do not agree on the need for
sweeping change.
83% say they favor a bigger government providing
more services, though in contrast to their Progressive Left counterparts they
are more likely to say that government services should be modestly – as opposed
to greatly – expanded.
While they have liberal opinions on nearly all
issues, they tend to support more measured policy approaches than Progressive
Left and are more likely to favor compromise.
Like Progressive Left, Establishment Liberals
believe that a lot more needs to be done to achieve racial equity but, unlike
Progressive Left, believe it can be done within the current political system.
78% of Establishment Liberals say that police
funding should either stay the same or be increased.
Democratic Mainstays
They are 28% of the Democratic Coalition, making them
its largest group.
They are among the most diverse groups in terms of
race and ethnicity. 46% are White, 26% are Black, 20% are Hispanic and 4% are
Asian. They are the group with the largest share of Black non-Hispanic adults.
60% are women.
78% say that a lot more needs to be done to ensure
equal rights for all Americans. But they align with Establishment Liberals (not
Progressive Left), in their opposition to sweeping change.
79% prefer bigger government providing more services
over a smaller one providing fewer services.
More than half of Democratic Mainstays (58%)
describe themselves as moderate, 30% say they are liberal, while 9% say they
are conservative. (How’s THAT for label confusion?)
Democratic Mainstays are less liberal on immigration
and are more hawkish on foreign policy than other Democratic groups.
Only 28% think the number of legal immigrants
admitted to the country should increase, compared with 44% of Establishment
Liberals and 63% of Progressive Left.
They are the typology group most likely (57%) to say
that both border security and a path to citizenship should be given equal
priority in dealing with illegal immigration in the U.S.
Democratic Mainstays are the only Democratic
typology group in which a majority (80%) say U.S. policies should
try to keep the U.S as the only military superpower. 84% say the size of
America’s military should either stay the same or increase.
The biggest split with other Democratic types is on
issues related to criminal justice. 59% favor the death penalty for murder. 73%
believe that violent crime is a very big problem. 89% believe that police
funding should remain the same or be increased.
Outsider Left
They are 16% of the Democratic coalition and are by
far the youngest political typology group. 43% are under 30 and 83% are under
50.
They are racially and ethnically diverse. 49% are White,
20% are Hispanic, 15% are Black, and 10% are Asian. 57% are women.
Outsider Left tend to vote Democratic, but only 23%
believe that there is a real difference between Democrats and Republicans.
Only 30% identify as Democrats. 53% say they are
independents who lean toward the Democratic Party.
They are very liberal on most issues, especially on
race, immigration, climate, and social safety net.
They are the second least politically active group
in the coalition and have the second lowest voting rates.
And now, the Republican coalition:
Faith and Flag Conservatives
They are 23% of the Republican coalition.
They rank highest in political engagement of all groups
in the Republican coalition.
97% either identify as Republicans or lean toward
the Republican Party. 59% identify strongly with the GOP. This is the highest
share who identify strongly with either party across all nine typology groups.
They are the only typology group in which a majority
(75%) say government policies should support religious values.
83% say the decline in the share of Americans
belonging to an organized religion is bad for society.
They are the oldest typology group −
two-thirds are ages 50 and older, including a third who are at least 65, while
just 8% are under the age of 30.
85% are White, 7% are Hispanic, 1% are Black, and 2%
are Asian. 58% are men.
They are among the most likely to live in rural
communities.
Along with Committed Conservatives, Faith and Flag
Conservatives have the highest share of any group to say that “everyone has it
in their own power to succeed.”
84% say government aid to the poor does more harm
than good by making them too dependent on government.
Committed Conservatives
They are 15% of the Republican coalition. They are
very politically active and vote in high numbers.
82% are White, 10% are Hispanic, 3% are Asian, and
1% are Black. 58% are men.
56% are age 50 and older, including 31% who are at
least 65 years old.
Committed Conservatives are among the most educated
of the Republican coalition and are among the highest-income political typology
groups.
They are highly pro-business, favor limited
government, and are for international trade.
Compared to other groups in the coalition, they are
somewhat more moderate on issues related to racial equality and immigration
policies.
Committed Conservatives differ from other
Republican-oriented groups in some of their responses to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Two-thirds are pro-vaccine.
Along with Faith and Flag Conservatives, Committed
Conservatives have the highest share of any group to say that “everyone has it
in their own power to succeed.”
78% say government aid to the poor does more harm
than good by making them too dependent on government.
Populist Right
They are 23% of the Republican coalition.
85% are White, 7% are Hispanic, 1% are Black, and 4%
are Asian. 54% are women.
52% say that their personal finances are in only
fair or poor shape.
They are immigration hardliners.
Populist Right are more likely to say that illegal
immigration is a very big problem in the country today. 48% say that the number
of legal immigrants admitted to the U.S. should decrease.
They diverge from the rest of the Republican
coalition in their views about the economic system. 87% say that the economic
system in this country unfairly favors powerful interests.
Unlike other Republican typology groups, they are
critical of large corporations.
82% say that large corporations are having a
negative impact on the way things are going in the country, and nearly half
support higher taxes on the wealthy and on large corporations.
78% say that government aid to the poor does more
harm than good by making them too dependent on government.
Ambivalent Right
They are 18% of the Republican coalition.
68% of the Ambivalent Right are or lean Republican,
but 25% are or lean Democratic. They feel the least attached to either
political party.
They are the least conservative in the Republican coalition.
They are the youngest group in the coalition. 63%
are under 50.
They are the most racially and ethnically diverse
group in the coalition. 65% are White, 17% are Hispanic, 8% are Black, and 5%
are Asian. 54% are men.
Ambivalent Right differ from other Republican
typology groups with their support for legal abortion, more liberal views on
same-sex marriage, and they favor complete legalization of marijuana.
They agree with other Republican typology groups in
their preference for smaller government and less government regulation of
business.
74% say that government aid to the poor does more
harm than good by making them more dependent on government.
They are less politically engaged than other
Republican typology groups and they vote in lower numbers than the average
population.
Stressed Sideliners
This group is evenly split between the Democratic
and Republican coalitions.
The Democratic side represents 13% of their
coalition and the Republican side represents 15% of their coalition.
They have weak connections to either party.
52% are under the age of 50.
57% are White, 21% Hispanic, 10% Black, and 5%
Asian. 56% are women.
They are the most financially stressed. One-third
say they do not have a savings account.
They have a mixed bag of liberal and conservative preferences.
The more liberal favor bigger government and more safety net. The more
conservative want government to be tougher on crime.
33% say that government aid to the poor does more
harm than good by making them too dependent on government.
They are the least politically engaged of all the
typology groups and are the least likely to vote.
Now that you know the new typology groups, let’s get
back to the two essential questions:
Who voted for which candidates?
And why did they vote the way they did?
If you take a close look at the major features of
each typology group, you will find some significant similarities along with
significant differences within each of the two coalitions. To me, those
similarities and differences offer potentially valuable clues.
Those clues may tell us which presumed alliances, in
each coalition, are solid and which might be temporary. In other words: Where is
the upside for the next non-Progressive Left candidate?
The first step is to examine the information we have
about who the winning candidates are. What do each of them stand for and how did
each of them present themselves in the campaign?
We need to determine, as best we can, which groups other
than Progressive Left may have contributed in a significant way to the
Progressive candidates’ victories and which groups may have contributed in a significant
way to John Airasian’s victory.
To do this, it will help to get it straight from the
horses’ mouths by taking a closer look at what these winning candidates actually
told us about who they are and what they intend to do as members of the city
council.
But that’s for my next installment.
For now, I will leave you with this:
A wise city councilor, in another state, decades ago,
dealing with local hot-button issues, said that all city councils are made up
of two kinds of personalities: Pragmatists, like him, and ideologues. Pragmatists
are project-oriented, solution-driven, and non-partisan. Ideologues have a mission
to bring their world view and national partisan agenda to local government.
I suspect that as members of the new city council, John
Airasian, and Emily Izzo, will serve as non-ideological pragmatists and, in doing
so, they will carve out their own unique leadership roles.
Watching them establish themselves in the new
council might just remind us of two stand-out predecessors, who each performed
unique leadership roles in past councils.
Of course, I am referring to:
Anthony
“Sorry-For-Always-Doing-My-Homework-I-know-It-Makes-Some-Of-You-Look-Bad” Donato
and…
Ken
“I-Will-Now-Interrupt-This-Moonbat-Discussion-To-Return-This-Spaceship-To-Planet-Earth”
Woodland.
If you don’t get those lengthy nicknames, I will be
happy to explain them to you.
Ready or not, Happy Political New Year!
Bruce Coltin
The Battle For Watertown
